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Survey on synchrophasor data quality and cybersecurity
challenges, and evaluation of their interdependencies
Aditya SUNDARARAJAN1, Tanwir KHAN1, Amir MOGHADASI1,
Arif I. SARWAT1
Abstract Synchrophasor devices guarantee situation
awareness for real-time monitoring and operational visi-
bility of smart grid. With their widespread implementation,
significant challenges have emerged, especially in com-
munication, data quality and cybersecurity. The existing
literature treats these challenges as separate problems,
when in reality, they have a complex interplay. This paper
conducts a comprehensive review of quality and cyberse-
curity challenges for synchrophasors, and identifies the
interdependencies between them. It also summarizes dif-
ferent methods used to evaluate the dependency and sur-
veys how quality checking methods can be used to detect
potential cyberattacks. This paper serves as a starting point
for researchers entering the fields of synchrophasor data
analytics and security.
Keywords Synchrophasors, Data quality, Cybersecurity,
Methodologies
1 Introduction
Smart grid has complex dependencies between physical
and cyber realms [1–4]. This has been demonstrated by
recent attacks on smart grid which is summarized in
Table 1 [5–10]. These attacks exploited a limited visibility
of the system and inadequate support from reliability
coordinators [11–22]. Wide-area measurement systems
(WAMS) increase the situation awareness (SA) for oper-
ators [23–25]. WAMS devices that are part of the wide area
monitoring, protection, automation and control include
phasor measurement units (PMUs) at transmission, fre-
quency disturbance recorders (FDRs) at low-voltage dis-
tribution and micro-PMUs (l-PMUs) for distributed
renewables, called synchrophasors [26–35].
Significant challenges to the implementation of syn-
chrophasors have emerged in communication, data quality
and cybersecurity. The existing communication infras-
tructure is slow, expensive and inflexible. To leverage SA
and support timeliness, adequate quality checking methods
must be in-place at the phasor data concentrators (PDCs)
which aggregate and process raw data and flag corrupt data.
Due to their ubiquity, synchrophasors have an increased
attack surface. The applications and challenges of syn-
chrophasors are wellresearched [36–41]. However, the
challenges of data quality and cybersecurity are considered
one independent of the other, when in reality, they are
interdependent [42–69]. Further, the literature does not
leverage the knowledge of one challenge to address the
other. For example, studying the changes to data quality
can be key to potentially identify an underlying attack
vector or an unexploited vulnerability.
The main contributions of this paper are:  maps the
dependencies between data quality and cybersecurity chal-
lenges of synchrophasors;` reviews the methods to evaluate
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the challenges; and ´ surveys how data quality checking
methods can leverage their observations to detect issues
related to security. The paper also provides a high-level
overviewof synchrophasors, their standards, key applications,
and challenges [70–73]. It is key to know that poor quality can
be due to device errors or communication challenges like
congestion and packet collision. Similarly, all cyber-attacks
do not impact the data, although reduction in quality is one of
the biggest observable consequences of a successful attack. A
layout of WAMS comprising synchrophasors is shown in
Fig. 1. This paper explores the challenges for PMUs at
transmission and FDRs at distribution level.
This survey paper considers data quality and cyberse-
curity as challenges, where each has different issues. Issues
are the ways in which the particular challenge manifests
when observed. Figure 2 maps the challenges to their
corresponding issues. The challenge of quality manifests in
three ways: noise, outliers and missingness. Noise can be
due to logical inconsistencies in data values or attributes
while outliers result from poor integrity and origination.
Missing data is a direct consequence of poor completeness
and availability. Accuracy is impacted by noise, outliers as
well as missingness while plausibility is a characteristic
impacted by noise and outliers. These characteristics are
discussed in Section 3.1. Cybersecurity manifests as delay/
Table 1 Summary of the recent cyberattacks on smart grid impacting data quality
Source of attack (Year) Target of attack Data quality
characteristic
impacted
Cybersecurity
characteristic
impacted
Attack specifics
Vulnerability in network
firewall (2001)
California ISO (CAISO) web
servers
Consistency, accuracy Integrity Poor security configuration
during planned maintenance
Stuxnet worm (2010) Programmable logic
controllers (PLCs) at
SCADA
Accuracy,
consistency,
plausibility
Integrity,
availability
Exploits zero-day vulnerabilities
of PLCs
BlackEnergy (2011) Human-machine interface of
utility grid control systems
Plausibility, origin,
accuracy,
consistency
Confidentiality,
integrity,
availability
General electric’s human
machine interface (HMI)
targeted
Remote access Trojan;
watering-hole attack
(2014)
Industrial control system
(ICS)/SCADA
Plausibility, origin,
accuracy,
consistency
Confidentiality,
integrity,
availability
Conducted by dragonfly,
energetic bear
Trojan.Laziok
reconnaissance malware
(2015)
Energy companies Origin, plausibility Confidentiality Gathered information from
compromised devices
BlackEnergy3 (2015) Ukrainian grid control center Plausibility, origin,
accuracy,
consistency
Confidentiality,
integrity,
availability
Lack of SA left 220000?
customers without power
WannaCry ransomware
cryptoworm (2017)
Computers running microsoft
Windows operating system
Availability, origin Availability Used EternalBlue, a
vulnerability in older
Windows systems
SCADA, Control center
Super PDC
Transformer
PMU PMU PMU PMU
PMU
Local PDC
μ-PMU
Distribution
substation
Transmission
substation
Smart loads
PV
Residential loads
Spot
loads
FDR
Ethernet
WAN
μ-PMU
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Fig. 1 Layout of smart grid WAMS comprising PMUs, l-PMUs,
FDRs and PDCs
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Fig. 2 Proposed structure
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loss, manipulation or theft. While a delay/loss corresponds
to a packet delay or drop due to congestion, timeout, buffer
fullness or an intentional attack that affects availability,
manipulation deals with attacks that alter the information,
thereby impacting integrity. Theft captures attacks which
compromise the confidentiality of data such as snooping,
spoofing or espionage. These attacks occur at different
levels of the synchrophasor hierarchy: Device corresponds
to the edge devices like PMUs, FDRs, or l-PMUs, while
Aggregator implies Local PDCs or SuperPDCs. Commu-
nication refers to the synchrophasor network while Appli-
cation contains the different power system applications that
use synchrophasor data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
summarizes the architecture, major applications and key
challenges of synchrophasors. The characteristics are descri-
bed in Section 3, and their interdependencies mapped in
Section 4. While evaluation methods for data quality and
cybersecurity are discussed in Section 4.1, Section 4.2 sur-
veys methods which use data quality characteristics to detect
potential cyber-attacks. Section 5 highlights future directions
of research in synchrophasor data analytics and cybersecurity.
2 Architecture, applications, challenges
Synchrophasors can be standalone devices with dedi-
cated purposes, or be a part of a larger system like the
substations, depending on various functional and opera-
tional requirements. With increased penetration of renew-
ables and smart loads, synchrophasors are used at
distribution transformers and points of common coupling to
study frequency disturbances and harmonics. The archi-
tecture of synchrophasor devices are summarized at the
device and network levels below.
1) PMU device: It comprises current transformers (CTs)
and potential transformers (PTs) that measure current
and voltage magnitudes which are then converted to
digital data, a microprocessor module that compiles
these values, computes phasors, and synchronizes them
with the coordinated universal time (UTC) standard
reference used by global positioning system (GPS)
receivers that acquire a time-lag based on the atomic
clock of GPS satellites [23, 74–77]. They measure local
frequency and its rate of change, and can record
individual phase voltage and current along with har-
monics, negative and zero sequence values [78]. The
information paints a dynamic picture of the grid at a
given time. PMUs and PDCs transmit measured data as
frames [79]. A 16-bit cyclic redundancy check ensures
data integrity. PDCs equipped with logging functional-
ity use comma separated values or transient data
exchange for data logs, and common format for event
data exchange for event logs [80, 81]. The data transfer
rate of PMUs, which determine the message processing
delays and network latencies, depend greatly on the
timing requirements of applications.
2) PMU network: If there are multiple PMUs in a
substation, Local PDCs aggregate site-level data and
then transmit to a SuperPDC. PDCs conduct various
data quality checks and set flags according to the issues
encountered, log performance, validate, transform,
scale and normalize data, and convert between protocols
[82]. There is typically a direct interface between PDC
and the utility’s SCADAor energymanagement system.
PDCs can be deployed as standalone devices or
integrated with other systems in the grid.
3) FDR device: The Oak Ridge National Laboratory and
the University of Tennessee Knoxville have been
leading the FNET/GridEye project since 2004. FDRs
have been installed and managed to capture dynamic
behaviors of the grid. Although FDRs are essentially
PMUs, they are connected at 120 V, and hence incur
lower installation costs than traditional PMUs do [83].
FDRs are largely deployed at renewable integration
zones of the grid, and measure nearly 1440 samples
per second with a hardware accuracy of ±0.5 mHz
while PMUs measure between 10 and 240 samples per
second and use GPS receivers that have 1ls accuracy
for synchronization [84–87]. Given the availability of
an extensive discussion of the architecture by the
author of [88, 89], it is beyond the scope of this paper.
4) FDR network: FDRs use the internet to send data
directly to the central servers for analytics and can
provide information on transients, load shedding,
breaker reclosing and the switching operations of
capacitor banks and load tap changers [87]. Unlike
PMUs, FDRs can be installed at buildings and offices.
5) Synchrophasor standards: Multiple standards exist for
PMU data measurement, transfer and communication,
proposed by IEEE, the National Institute of Standards
& Technology (NIST), the North American Electric
Reliability Commission (NERC) and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) [90–97]. Due to
multiple specifications and guidelines, there are pos-
sible contradictions in recommendations [70–73, 98].
A North American SynchroPhasor Initiative (NASPI)
report in early 2016 identified the need for standard-
izing definitions related to synchrophasor data quality
and availability by establishing the PMU applications
requirements task force (PARTF) [99]. IEEE standard
C37.X deals with WAMS, specifically PMUs
[82, 100, 101]. These standards are summarized in
Table 2 with their core contributions highlighted. A
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more comprehensive review of the synchrophasor
standards is documented in [102].
6) Applications: Synchrophasors streamline security, reli-
ability and stability of power systems. They have online
and offline applications [103]. Online applications of
PMUs include enhancing real-time SA, analyzing faults
and disturbances, detecting and appraising oscillations
and harmonics that impact power quality, and improv-
ing accuracy and reducing computational time of state
estimation. Offline applications include congestion
management, providing effective protection schemes,
benchmarking, system restoration, overloadmonitoring
and dynamic rating, validating the network model of
SCADA, and improving overall power quality
[25, 104, 105]. Real-time (online) applications of FDRs
include frequency monitoring interface integrated with
command and control centers in the future for power
system health diagnosis to prevent cascading failures,
and event trigger module that detects and notifies the
mismatch between generation and load caused by
frequency variations. Offline applications include event
visualization that renders the data read from the even
data files [106].
7) Challenges: One of the major drawbacks of synchropha-
sors is the lack of transmission protocol, which makes
them vulnerable to spoofing attacks [26]. The existing
architecture is not scalable since it entails an initially high
investment. NASPI’s research initiative task force
(RITT) emphasizes optimal placement as a significant
challenge but also one dependent on the nature of
applications the utility intends to use them for [18]. The
literature hasmultiplemodels including but not limited to
genetic algorithm, simulated annealing, Tabu search,
Madtharads method, particle swarm optimization, artifi-
cial neural networks, binary search and binary integer
programming to address this challenge
[27, 28, 31–34, 107, 108]. More recently, managing
and analyzing large volumes of synchrophasor data has
become increasingly challenging. Lack of standardized
data management solutions for smart grid has only made
this problem more challenging. The ubiquitous presence
of these devices has expanded their attack surface,
making them vulnerable to different types of attacks.
These two challenges are elaborated in the following
section since they percolate to applications that directly
operate upon the streaming data subject to minimal
processing owing to timeliness requirements.
3 Data quality and cybersecurity challenges
in synchrophasors
Due to their wide-ranging communication and automa-
tion capabilities, the challenges of synchrophasor data
quality and cybersecurity have gained prominence.
Table 2 Various standards and guidelines for synchrophasors
Body Standard Core contribution
IEEE 1344-1995 Original parameter definitions for synchrophasors
C37.118-2005 Improved message formats, inclusion of time quality, total vector error (TVE)
C37.239-2010 PMU/PDC event logging
1711-2010 Serial SCADA protection protocol for substation serial link cybersecurity
C37.118.1-2011 PMU measurement provisions, performance requirements
C37.118.2-2011 Synchrophasor data transfer requirements
C37.238-2011 Common profile for applying precision time protocol (PTP) using Ethernet
C37.242-2013 Synchronization, calibration, testing and installation of PMUs for PC
C37.244-2013 PDC functions and requirements for PC and monitoring
C37.111-2013 PMU/PDC data logging using COMFEDE
1686-2013 Procuring, installing and commissioning IED cybersecurity
C37.240-2014 Sound engineering practices for high cybersecurity of substation APC
IEC 61850 Interoperable and adaptable architectures to substation automation
61850-90-5 Requirements for data exchange between PMUs, PDCs, PCs and control center
62351-1,2 Security threats and vulnerabilities in smart grid devices
62351-6 Prescribes digital signature using asymmetric cryptography for sending PMU data
NERC CIP 002-009 Series of standards to ensure enterprise, field and personnel security
NIST NISTIR 7628 Provides guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity (including WAMS)
452 Aditya SUNDARARAJAN et al.
123
3.1 Data quality challenges
NERC’s real-time tools best practices task force
(RTBPTF) and NASPI’s PARTF impose requirements to
ensure synchrophasor data quality [42, 109]. Data quality
can be contextualized in different ways, depending on the
needs of the concerned domain. For instance, data quality
requirements of a smart meter recording energy con-
sumption might differ from those of a net meter at a solar
photovoltaic (PV) power plant. NASPI contextualizes
synchrophasor data quality to determine ‘‘fitness of use’’ in
terms of accuracy and lineage for static data points; lin-
eage, completeness and logical consistency for static
datasets; and availability, timeliness and origination for
streams of data points [42].
There could be different causes for poor data quality as
follow.
1) Device: poor calibration of device, biases due to CT,
PT; erroneous filter design, poor synchronization of
timing measurements, and issues due to measurement
channel;
2) Communication: latency exceeding stipulated limits,
network congestion, signal interferences and failure of
communication nodes;
3) Aggregator: data transformation resulting in errors,
delayed arrival of packets dropped due to time-limit
exceeding, and unwanted duplication or corruption of
data during computations;
4) Application: storage and maintenance issues, insuffi-
cient training size, erroneous manipulations to the data
and poor association of context.
Although data quality requirements vary with applica-
tions, they have been extensively documented
[42, 52, 102, 109]. The existing literature on synchrophasor
data quality is summarized in Table 3.
1) Completeness: focuses on the gaps between different
values, accounts for missing values [42]. The attributes
of completeness defined at device and aggregator-levels
are: gap rate—number of gaps in data per unit time;
mean gap size—mean of the length of known gaps; and
largest known gap—length of the largest known gap
among the different gaps. While completeness is
impacted by device malfunction, packet drops and
communication link failure, the literature does not rec-
ognize the possibility of an attack behind such causes.
2) Accuracy: can be of the value or attribute, primarily
measured in total vector error (TVE), which according
to IEEE standard C37.118, is the vector difference
between the measured and expected phasor value
(magnitude, angle and frequency). Accuracy is cate-
gorized into that of: data values—impacted by factors
like the difference between expected and observed
signals or the introduction of noise to the data within
the synchrophasor; and data attributes—affected by
factors like accuracy of the measured timestamp,
agreement between encoded and actual location coor-
dinates of the device, and alignment of the location
recorded in the power system topology with its actual
location [46].
3) Plausibility and Availability: Measurement specifiers
are the attributes of data which describe whether the
process of measuring some phenomenon of the power
system (observed value) and calculating its value
(expected value) are documented effectively in terms
of standard units to a given precision and are within a
stated confidence interval [46, 48]. These specifiers
have decisive sub-attributes influencing the qualitative
value of data: data representing the measurement of
quality or condition of the grid, and data represented in
the form of SI units up to 3 decimal places with a
confidence interval included.
Network availability plays an important role in
streaming data [49], and in-turn affects data availabil-
ity. In case of high network latency, the incoming data
streams from different synchrophasors get delayed or
lost, causing applications to perceive them as missing
or incomplete. Hence, network availability can be
considered an indirect attribute affecting quality. This
can be mitigated if the overlying applications are
programmed to account for the delays, or if a more
lenient waiting time limit is set. However, the second
solution is dependent on the kind of applications the
synchrophasors cater to. The latency requirements for
synchrophasors recommended by the standards are
very stringent.
4) Origination: is the source from which the data is
measured. Its trustworthiness is associated with the
background and source. Its attributes are as follow. 
Point of origin: the class of device from where the data
originated (measurement (M) or performance (P) for
PMUs), the standard followed by the device, and any
data manipulation or standardization techniques
through which the data passes [42, 118]; ` Coverage:
physical location of the device based on its geospatial
or electrical topology location [44, 45]; ´ Transfor-
mation applied to the data at the device, aggregator or
application level.
5) Consistency: determines how agreeable the data is
with the overall structure of its type. Incompatibility of
attributes in terms of measurement rates or header
labeling between datasets results in outliers, leading to
an inconsistent result from an application. The
attributes of consistency are as follow.  Header
frame consistency: consistency of the header frame of
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the device. This could be categorized into: persistence
of PMU header that states whether the PMU header
structure is consistent over time, and persistence of
PDC header that states whether the PDC header
structure is consistent over time. ` Data frame
consistency: consistency of data frames of the device.
This could be categorized into: persistence of PMU
data frame that states whether the PMU data frame
structure is consistent over time, and persistence of the
PDC data frame that states whether the PDC data
frame structure is consistent over time. ´ Order
consistency of data frames: whether the order in which
the data frames are recorded is consistent in the
device. ˆ Consistency in compliance to standards
recommended for PMU and all the devices associated
with it. ˜ Consistency of reporting rate: whether data
reporting rate is consistent across all devices.
Emerging research in this area has lately focused on
determining solutions for ensuring data quality. These
solutions include using omnidirectional antennas to
Table 3 Summary of existing research in synchrophasor data quality challenges and solutions
Attribute Challenges Solutions
Completeness (Device,
Aggregator) [42, 50, 110]
PMU/PDC device damage
Faulty PMU-PDC communication
Network error
Database storage error
Data missing for failing to comply with latency and QoS
requirements
Acquiring better management techniques
Use of TCP protocol to re-transmit the lost data
packets at the cost of timeliness
Adjusting the synchrophasor frame rate by
increasing the wait time at PDC
Measurement accuracy (Device)
[42, 43, 110–113]
Expected signal differs from measured signal due to
harmonic interference
Introduction of noise to data
Improving phase error using filtering
techniques
NIST calibration per Standard C37.118-2005
Omnidirectional antennas
Context-based reconstruction of missing data
Network time protocol (NTP), e-Loran and
chip scale atomic clock (CSAC)
Attribute accuracy (Device,
Aggregator, Communication)
[42, 44]
Measured vs actual timestamp discrepancy due to
satellite timing error; disagreement between encoded
and actual location of PMU
Development of linear state estimation tools
Avoiding timestamp discrepancy by
modifying
real-time clock element
Using OMP-based identification, BB algorithm
to solve PMU location discrepancies
Plausibility and availability
(Communication, Application)
[47–49, 51, 114, 115]
Impact of measurement system on individual data points
Data inaccessibility due to high network
latency or device failure
Delayed data arrival due to increased
routing traffic
Use of electrical data recorder (EDR) tools for
capturing high-rate time series data, data
storage and analysis
A more lenient time limit could be set for
noncritical application usage
Latency-aware application design
Origination (Device, Aggregator,
Communication, Application)
[42, 53, 116, 117]
Poor standard interpretation, implementation
Misalignment, erroneous compression
Latency, loss of communication nodes
Data corruption due to delivery time of
PDC exceeding permissible slot
Network unavailability to process incoming data streams
Redundancy in communication by using
wireless and wired connections
Lagrange interpolating polynomial method
Data substitution, imputation, interpolation and
extrapolation
Stochastic forecasting with prediction error
minimization (PEM)
Logical consistency (Aggregator,
Communication) [42]
Data transmitted contains no headers
Sampling rate of data changed at PMU without being
adjusted at PDC
Data duplication while processing
Data from different PMUs with incorrect timestamps
Logical consistency can be ensured by
maintaining the PMU registries and data
protocols
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improve GPS availability, context-aware determina-
tion of missing data streams using accurate timing
information, network time protocol (NTP) and asso-
ciated chip scale atomic clocks (CSACs) as backups
for synchronization when GPS fails, imputation,
interpolation and extrapolation, stochastic forecasting
with prediction error minimization (PEM) and data
substitution [52].
6) Evaluation of quality: Methods to evaluate quality is
discussed in Section 4.1. The approach for perfor-
mance evaluation is to first study the impacts of device
calibration and network conditions on quality, then
examine how poor quality reduces the application
performance [42]. Two effective methods are pro-
posed to evaluate the impact of quality on perfor-
mance:  Benchmarking that tests an application
multiple times with numerous erroneous datasets in
contrast to those with no known errors, and `
Standardization that documents, for each application,
the level of tolerable errors.
3.2 Cybersecurity challenges
Synchrophasors cater to applications like state estima-
tion, contingency analysis and optimal power flow that
need real-time high-resolution data measurement, com-
munication and analytics [119]. Therefore, a successful
attack on these devices might cause erroneous SA or cas-
cading failures [56, 120]. Yet, many industrial organiza-
tions do not consider synchrophasors as critical cyber
assets. Recent cyberattacks on the smart grid in Table 1
mostly used powerful malware like worms, viruses or
Trojan horse, but a few attacks like the one on the Pacific
Gas & Electric transmission substation relied on physical
means. These attacks jeopardized not just the availability
of power but also that of control data (information). In
Table 4, cybersecurity of synchrophasors are categorized
into:  Device, Aggregator; ` Communication; and ´
Control center application.
1) Device, Aggregator: NASPI network (NASPInet) is
logically capable of integrating WAMS across multi-
ple geographically distant organizations using phasor
gateways (PGWs). The attacks at this level compro-
mise data integrity, targeting devices from individual
PMUs to PDCs, SuperPDCs or even PGWs. Some
attacks include:  tampering the signal measurement
units of devices through interference; ` illicitly
changing the calibration of devices to report erroneous
readings; ´ forging data to reflect wrong measure-
ments; and ˆ GPS spoofing by broadcasting fabricated
Table 4 Summary of existing research in synchrophasor cybersecurity challenges and solutions
Level Challenges Solutions
Device, Aggregator
[54, 55, 97, 102, 110, 121]
Device damage
Device calibration
tampering
Forging PMU data
GPS spoofing
Multi-alteration technique to trace adversary in event of GPS spoofing
Visible GPS satellite prediction
Anomaly between expected and measured GPS signals
Using SSL/TLS or IPSec to encrypt data before transmission
Using state estimation technique to mitigate device calibration and
tampering
Rigorous penetration testing prior to installation
Communication
[57, 61, 62, 66, 112–115, 122]
Denial of service
Man-in-the-middle
False data injection
Snooping attack
Delay attack
Airgapping PMU network
Filtering routers, disabling IP broadcasts, applying security patches,
disabling unused ports
Server authentication by clients before establishing connection
Use of time-series state estimation
Cryptographic methods like AES, DES
Mutual authentication
Cyber trust model with blockchains
NASPInet hub-spoke model
Optimal key generation and distribution
Application [63–65, 116, 117] Phishing and social
engineering
APT and insider threats
Replay attacks
Authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA)
Use of secure data transfer protocol to prevent replay attack
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signals to the receiver to yield erroneous synchro-
nization of phasors computed, modifying satellite
position, or replaying legitimate GPS signals at later
timestamps [54].
GPS spoofing can be mitigated by enabling the
receiver to predict visible GPS satellites at a given
position and time instant and use the coarse/acquisi-
tion (C/A) code from those satellites. Another strategy
compares the measured GPS signal to the estimated
signal and computes the anomaly error which must
have an accuracy of B 40 ns for nearly 95% of the
values according to IEEE C37.118 [44]. Synchropha-
sors must be subject to rigorous testing before instal-
lation. Some methods include port scans, device
security feature robustness, network congestion test-
ing, denial of service testing, network traffic sniffing
and disclosure testing [55]. These tests should be
periodically conducted by certified white hat penetra-
tion testers after installation. Regular patches and
configuration updates must be made down to the end-
device level.
2) Communication: Synchrophasors support bidirectional
communication channels, where data measurements
flow from devices to the control center while control
signals flow the other way. The vulnerabilities of the
protocols used by the devices also contribute to the
overall security. Attacks on communication channels
compromise integrity, availability and confidentiality.
Some attacks include:  Denial of service (DoS) by
overwhelming PMUs, PDCs or other aggregation
devices higher in the hierarchy with bogus frames so
that legitimate frames are lost, delayed, denied or
dropped; ` Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks by a
malicious entity posing itself as PDC (to PMU) or
PGW (to PDC) and sending malicious commands that
causes PMUs/PDCs to behave in an abnormal manner
that triggers failures; ´ False data injection (FDI) by
intercepting frames over the channel, altering or
replacing them with malicious information that then
gets propagated to higher levels of the WAMS; ˆ
Snooping by the attacker eavesdropping on the chan-
nel for incoming or outgoing frames, typically not
modifying or stealing but just capturing a copy of that
information for packet replay or espionage; and ˜
Delay caused by compromising communication rou-
ters that deliberately induce latencies in propagation to
critically affect the grid’s SA.
Many authentication and authorization algorithms
are proposed to secure synchrophasor data over
communication channels [57]. These methods range
from conventional encryption methods to cyber trust.
Due to the ubiquity and widespread range of these
devices, key distribution and management becomes a
problem. Mutual authentication is also proposed to
account for trust [61]. Decentralized, blockchain-based
trust acquisition is being considered too. The publish-
subscribe hub-spoke architecture proposed by NAS-
PInet supports dynamic sharing of device data to
alleviate shortcomings of the communication medium
like delays and latencies. Standards like IEC
61850-90-5 recommend trusted key distribution center
to generate and distribute keys that meet system
requirements [63–66].
3) Application: Despite being protected by enterprise
security tools for intrusion detection and prevention,
virtualization, segmentation, authentication, authoriza-
tion and access control, cyberattacks still proliferate
[67, 68]. It is understood that any successful attack at
the other two levels perpetrated in a manner unde-
tectable by the enterprise security systems can pose a
significant threat. The attacks at this level are the most
dangerous, since crucial power system applications
use data from WAMS to conduct analysis to address
reliability, power quality, network topology, and
faults. An adverse impact on these calculations could
compromise the ‘‘self-healing’’ nature of the grid.
More recent solutions include game theory, machine
learning, proactive data visualization, and defense-in-
depth [12, 123].
3.2.1 Evaluation of security
Works have tested the resilience of PMUs and PDCs
against different attacks. The authors in [124] conducted
penetration testing of a synchrophasor network in IEEE
68-bus system to map vulnerabilities against the common
vulnerabilities exposure (CVE) database. Potential correc-
tive measures to ensure the security of PMUs and PDCs is
proposed [125]. Considering the security at substation and
information levels, the authors provide a wide range of
tools to mitigate breaches at both fronts. A multilayered
architecture at the substation is proposed where different
levels of data abstraction is provided between PMUs and
external environment, supplemented by firewalls, user
datagram protocol (UDP) secure for communication over
untrusted networks, and remote access using secure shell
(SSH).
4 Data quality-cybersecurity dependency
The severity of an attack can be understood from the
extent of its impacts on the targeted system. With the smart
grid encouraging interoperability between devices, infor-
mation, applications, and protocols, a transparent and direct
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information exchange is now feasible. This also means that
if information in one of the interconnected systems is
infected, it is bound to propagate to other systems upon
exchange, affecting the whole network. Synchrophasor
devices harbor such vulnerabilities, as summarized in
Section 3.2. However, to mitigate cyberattacks on inter-
connected systems, the relationship between devices and
data must be known.
Table 5 summarizes key interdependencies between the
two challenges. There is a tight coupling between data
quality and cyber-attacks, implying it is wise to study
synchrophasor cybersecurity by accounting for the impacts
on quality. In most attacks, plausibility, completeness,
accuracy and consistency are primarily impacted
[126, 127]. In Section 4.1, specific evaluation methods for
quantifying this relationship are reviewed. Section 4.2
looks at how data quality characteristics can be used as
markers to detect potential cyber-attacks within the context
of synchrophasors. Results from these subsections are
summarized in Tables 6 and 7, respectively.
4.1 Interdependency evaluation methods
Next to communications, cybersecurity was found to
impact the design and installation costs for synchrophasors
[141]. This is because they are critical to the missionsup-
port systems of the grid. Different practical ways for util-
ities to mitigate quality issues like accuracy, timeliness and
consistency are also identified. Some methods include
employing dedicated communication channels between
PMUs and PDCs, encrypting PMU data before communi-
cation, and enhancing communication endpoints using
firewalls and routers. The report, however, does not delve
into the details of how such methods could impact latency
(and hence, timeliness) and availability of the data.
Given different manufacturers of devices, there will be
differences in measurement and calibration quality despite
adhering to the standards. The varying application
requirements cause differences in application-level PMU
performance, of which data quality is a major one. The
static and dynamic PMU testing efforts of the Performance
and Standards Task Team (PSTT) of NASPI and the PMU
performance characterization are briefly summarized in
[142]. In it, the different steady-state tests performed on
magnitude, phase and frequency evaluate their confor-
mance to accuracy requirements, which is an important
attribute of data quality and is a direct target of many
cyberattacks. Given the impact of instrumentation channels
on the quality, they have been well-characterized and
evaluated for impacts on accuracy in the literature. The
errors induced by them could be rectified through model-
based correction algorithms and state estimation based
error filtering. Some other avenues where data quality
could be evaluated include the cable configurations, testing
and validating the devices to ensure accurate, consistent
performance and interoperability at all levels [143, 144].
Although not explicit, these works hint at the improvement
in the resilience of synchrophasor devices against poten-
tially malicious activities by accounting for proper testing
methods to characterize and evaluate the different sources
of errors prior to deployment that might contribute to poor
quality.
Final conclusions can be gathered from [145]. The
report by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
(PNNL) analyzes existing synchrophasor networks in terms
of their communication and information-level interoper-
ability, security and performance. It concluded that latency
is a key issue for the future synchrophasor designs which is
expected to compound latency due to PDC functionality. It
also emphasized that substations generally did not employ
Table 5 Summary of the interdependency between quality and cybersecurity challenges
Level Quality attribute Quality issue Cyber-attack observed Security attribute
impacted
Device Completeness, accuracy,
plausibility
Synchronization signal loss,
measurement signal loss,
missing data
GPS spoofing, replay, device
tamper, changing device
calibration, FDI
Integrity
Aggregator Origin, consistency,
plausibility
Corrupted data, anomalies,
outliers
FDI, tampering, buffer overflow,
MITM
Confidentiality,
integrity
Communication Availability, origin,
consistency
Anomalies, outliers, inconsistent,
out-of-order data
DoS, MITM, FDI,
snooping, replay, delay
Confidentiality,
integrity,
availability
Application Origin, availability,
consistency,
completeness, accuracy
DoS, delay, APT, FDI, theft/fraud,
insider attack
Corrupted data,
missingness, anomalies,
outliers
Confidentiality,
integrity,
availability
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redundancy; there is little consistency in adoption of
security methods for synchrophasor networks. Some tools
include link-level encryption, virtual private networks
(VPNs), ID/IPS, firewalls and access control lists (ACLs).
Further, existing data quality checking methods locate a
compromise in integrity by identifying faulted data values
(due to measurement errors, communication delays or
external events) but not due to result of device tampering,
MITM, spoofing or FDI. Since both faults and attacks have
the same impact on quality, it is important to differentiate
the two causes while checking for the attributes such as
accuracy, consistency and timeliness.
To summarize, the following measures can be used as
metrics to quantify data quality: TVE, errors in magnitude,
phase, frequency and ROCOF, harmonics and noise for
measurement accuracy; comparison between measured and
expected results, confidence interval and precision for
measurement specifiers; temporal, geospatial and
topological accuracy for attribute accuracy; device model
specifications, geospatial and topological coordinates,
coverage and content for origination; persistence in Header
and Data frames, standards compliance, reporting rate and
order for logical consistency; and gap rate, gap size and
largest known gap for completeness. Benchmarking and
standardization are two methods that can be used to eval-
uate data quality. Similarly, cybersecurity can be quantified
by conducting extensive penetration testing of the syn-
chrophasor networks integrated into benchmarked IEEE
bus systems for different types of attacks (DoS, MITM,
FDI, spoofing, probing, cache poisoning) and discovering
potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited. While
doing so, it would be important to also repeat the evalua-
tion of the quality attributes using the above metrics and
explore how they are impacted due to the specific attacks,
and whether they violate the industry standards require-
ments specified for different applications.
Table 6 Summary of evaluation methods for quality (DQ) and cybersecurity (CS) issues
Issue Challenge Evaluation methods
Noise (DQ) Consistency, accuracy Cable configuration, testing, validation
Specifying confidence interval, precision, TVE,
ROCOF for measurements
Evaluating instrumentation channels
Model-based correction
State estimation-based error filtering
Presistence in Data/Header frames
Standards compliance
Outlier (DQ) Consistency, origin, accuracy Standardization, benchmarking
Enhancing endpoints with switches, routers
Specifying device model, coverage and content
Missingness (DQ) Completeness, availability, accuracy Dedicated communication channels
Enhancing endpoints with switches, routers
Delay/loss (CS) All levels Regular penetration testing of all levels
Link-level encryption, selective encryption
Dedicated communication channels
Data redundancy for fault tolerance
Manipulation (CS) Device, Aggregator, Communication Regular penetration testing of all levels
Link-level encryption, selective encryption
Data abstraction, multi-layered architecture
Data redundancy for fault tolerance
Augmenting ID/IPS, firewalls, ACLs, VPNs
Theft (CS) Device, Aggregator, Communication Regular penetration testing of all levels
Data abstraction, multi-layered architecture
Data redundancy for fault tolerance
Augmenting firewalls, ACLs, VPNs
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Table 7 Summary showing how quality can help identify cybersecurity issues
Cyber-attack Quality affected Quality check looks for Mitigation methods using quality
Device tampering (delay/
loss, theft) [128, 129]
Completeness, plausibility,
accuracy, consistency,
origination
Large gap sizes, inaccurate readings, ping fail Statistical substitution: regression,
imputation, interpolation
Intelligent substitution: neural
networks, logistic regression,
optimization
Securing the physical devices
Spoofing PMU data
(manipulation)
[130–132]
Consistency, accuracy,
plausibility
Unexpected values, errors, mismatch with
SCADA values, redundant timestamp, out-of-
order packet arrival
Monitoring line impedances for
anomalies
Divergence and miscorrelation
between SCADA and PMU data
GPS spoofing
(manipulation, delay/
loss) [54, 133–135]
Consistency, origination,
plausibility
Inaccurate timing value, TVE[ 1%, packets
arrive out-of-order
Using multiple synchronization
sources or telecommunications
Anti-spoofing checking methods
at receivers
Internal holdover oscillators as
backups for providing accurate
timing signals
Spoofing match algorithm with
Golden Search for lighter
computation
Denial of service (delay/
loss) [129]
Completeness, accuracy,
consistency
Congestion at PDCs/network, delayed arrival of
packets, dropped packets, inability to reach
suspected device
Augmenting PDCs with inline
blocking tools
Employ port hardening and
disable IP broadcasts
Use high bandwidth
communications (expensive)
Man-in-the-middle
(delay/loss,
manipulation, theft)
[129]
Origination, accuracy,
availability, consistency
Mismatch between obtained and expected value,
abnormal delay in packet arrival
Mutual authentication, message
authentication codes
Digital certificates with active
management of CRLs
False data injection
(manipulation, theft)
[136–140]
Plausibility, consistency,
accuracy, origination
Mismatch with SCADA values, unexpected
values, spatio-temporal outliers
Spatio-temporal correlations,
density based local outlier
factoring
Monitor line impedance for
anomalies
Random time-hopping of packets
Divergence and miscorrelation
between SCADA and PMU data
Snooping, sniffing (theft)
[59, 129]
Plausibility, origin No observable changesadditional analysis
needed
Using secure gateway/VPN
communication
Employing TLS/SSL, SSH,
lightweight selective encryption
Delay (delay/loss)
[59, 129]
Completeness, consistency,
availability, accuracy
Observable patterns in gaps, slow arrival of
packets
Statistical and intelligent
substitutions
Redundant measurement devices
on the same line
APT, insider threat
(delay/loss, theft,
manipulation) [123]
Accuracy, consistency,
origin, plausibility
No observable changesadditional analysis
needed
Defense-in-depth
Machine learning, advanced data
analytics
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4.2 Addressing cyber-attacks using quality issues
It can be seen from Table 7 that successful cyberattacks
compromise synchrophasor data quality since the security
requirements are violated [146]. Given synchrophasors use
TCP/UDP on the transport layer for their communications,
attacks typically possible on TCP/IP stack like DoS,
MITM, packet replay or spoofing are possible in syn-
chrophasor domains as well.
Physical attacks like device tampering causes loss or
incurs theft of critical information, easily observed through
large gaps sizes, poor accuracy in obtained values and
unreliable origin. The lost data is typically handled through
substitution, either statistical or intelligent [128, 129]. The
best way to prevent physical attacks like cable disconnects,
direct damage to device, etc. is by ensuring the devices are
isolated from external weather and human elements.
Spoofing synchrophasor data is achievable through
polynomial fitting or data mirroring techniques. Such
attacks impact quality that manifests as outliers or noise.
Several methods have been proposed to counter these
attacks: intra-PMU and inter-PMU correlations to deter-
mine the relationship between PMU parameters and across
PMUs in a locality, respectively; machine learning tech-
niques like support vector machines (SVMs) and more
[130–132].
GPS spoofing exploits publicly available civilian GPS
signals using air or cable to produce signals that initially
align with the original, but slowly start increasing the
power to drown the authentic signal and thereby compro-
mising the receiver [54, 133]. By introducing measurement
errors in the time synchronization, the attacks induce
changes in data consistency and plausibility which can be
used as markers to identify the likelihood of the attack
[134, 135, 147].
In a successful DoS where multiple synchrophasor
devices get compromised, packet delay or loss is observed.
This impact in quality can serve a clue to the onset of DoS-
style attacks. Typical solutions involve augmenting inline
blocking tools, high bandwidth connections, disabling IP
broadcasts and port hardening.
MITM is possible in synchrophasors where the attacker
acts as a legitimate PDC to the PMUs and viceversa,
thereby intercepting and/or modifying all messages
exchanged. This is noticed by quality checking methods in
the form of poor accuracy and consistency in values
between what was sent by PMU and what was received by
PDC. It can be avoided by having the devices employ
mutual authentication and a digital certificate mechanism
with an actively managed certificate evocation lists (CRLs)
and certificate authorities [59, 129].
FDI impacts the consistency, accuracy and plausibility
of the data. The effects are typically observed as spatio-
temporal outliers in the data. Quality checking methods
check for this anomaly and may employ correlation across
different timestamps to identify the corruption of data. FDI
is one of the widely explored attacks on synchrophasor
domain, with solutions like determining the mismatch
between the values obtained from PMUs and that observed
in SCADA, monitoring the line impedances which get
affected when data is manipulated, and using density-based
local outlier filter (LOF) analysis [136–140].
Sometimes, attackers simply capture the packets flowing
in a channel with an intent to listen. Such sniffing/snooping
attacks have been conducted using WireShark to realize
messages are exchanged in plaintext. This attack is difficult
to detect using data quality checking methods since most
often, no quality characteristic is impacted as the attackers
do not affect the data actively. However, technologies like
VPN, encryption of selective messages (to reduce the
overall process overhead), or transport layer security
(TLS)/secure ocket layer (SSL), secure shell (SSH) can be
used to mitigate them. While TLS has been shown to be
susceptible to poisoning attacks and VPN to side channel
attacks, careful network design can account for them
[129, 148].
With the increased frequency of campaign efforts and
nation-sponsored attacks against the grid, synchrophasors
could be lucrative targets for sophisticated attacks like
advanced persistent threats (APTs), social engineering,
watering-hole attacks and malware-based intrusions
[149–153]. While these attacks scale beyond specific
devices in the synchrophasor hierarchy, the quality
checking methods alone would not be sufficient [123]. The
use of defense-in-depth model augmented with stakeholder
interactions, awareness and training, and intelligent solu-
tions like machine learning for attack data classification
and/or event prediction, root-cause analysis of observed
events, developing evolving defense topographies using
moving target defense, and advanced visualization tech-
niques for efficient cognition of events would play a critical
role.
The key takeaway from this section is that impacts on
data quality can provide strong markers for an underlying
cyber-attack. Noise, outliers and missing values are all
commonly observed issues which quality checking meth-
ods may be programmed to detect, analyze and base
decisions on. Certain sophisticated attacks like APTs,
insider threats, sniffing, and social engineering have indi-
rect impacts on quality which a checking method may not
be able to detect with enough confidence or precision.
Additional solutions are required to mitigate such attacks in
the synchrophasor domain. These solutions include statis-
tical methods like divergence, correlation, regression and
substitution; intelligent methods like neural networks and
evolutionary algorithms for event classification and
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prediction, logistic regression for substitution; technologies
like VPNs, firewalls, ID/IPS, anomaly detectors, selective
encryption, port hardening, network isolation and use of
TLS/SSL, SSH; and human-in-the-loop solutions like
advanced visualization techniques, awareness and training,
and stakeholder engagements. While the impacts on quality
can also be due to underlying device or measurement
errors, most of the works in the literature assume the data
has been subject to delay/loss, manipulation or theft
intentionally. This paves way for the recommendation that
the upcoming research in this area must look at ways to
differentiate the impacts on data quality due to attacks from
errors.
5 Future directions of research and conclusion
The future directions of research in the areas of syn-
chrophasor data quality, cybersecurity and communications
are multi-faceted. Addressing data quality challenges must
begin with a strong push to the adoption of industry-wide,
vendor-agnostic data management, processing and storage
standards for smart grid. Most recent cyber-attacks were
successful due to the difference in speed of cognition of the
information generated by automated vulnerability detection
tools and the speed with which the machine data is created
(called cognitive gap) [123]. The design of synchrophasor
devices are also expected to improve in the future [103].
Keeping in mind the quality challenges, an improvement to
PDC design called flexible integrated synchrophasor sys-
tem (FIPS) was proposed to minimize issues in quality and
communication, and tackles specific tasks of PDC such as
data alignment, employs cryptographic methods to ensure
confidential exchange of data without jeopardizing integ-
rity, and establishes relevance to the NASPInet [121]. To
ensure device and applicationlevel interoperability, devel-
opment of technical standards and conformance testing
rules is expected. Further, the emergence of distribution-
level l-PMUs will evoke the need for developing mea-
surement, communication, quality and security standards.
Further, with the deployment of distributed renewable
sources, electric and autonomous vehicles, energy storage
and transactive energy, there is a strong impetus for
enhancing technologies behind monitoring and control, of
which synchrophasors will play a major role [141].
To conclude, while existing research has focused on the
synchrophasor challenges of quality and cybersecurity
individually, their interdependency has largely been
ignored. This paper makes one of the first attempts at
highlighting the impacts of cyber-attacks on various quality
attributes, thereby recommending that the future research
on the design and development of security solutions should
account for their impacts on quality as well, and that
different quality characteristics can be used by quality
checking methods to flag for potential cyber-attacks.
Plausibility, completeness, accuracy and consistency are
some of the attributes that are most adversely impacted by
a majority of the attacks on synchrophasors. At the same
time, not all cases of poor data quality imply a successful
cyber-attack as the reason. Different metrics that could be
used to quantify quality attributes were summarized, and
the methods that help evaluate the impacts of quality and
security on performance were also briefly highlighted. This
paper serves as a starting point for researchers entering
these areas as it summarizes and determines their interde-
pendency and relevance to smart grid security.
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